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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
LyDIL

JESSE J. LEAVITT and PHOEBE
LEAVITT, his wife
Plaintiff-Appellants,
vs.
ELEANOR BLOHM,
Defendant-Respondent,
vs.
VERDA LYNN,
Third Party Defendant.
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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 22, 1955, Forrest and Renae Hancock, fee
simple title holders of the property in dispute, sold the
same to Deloy E. Smith et ux by Uniform Real Estate Contract. The sales price was $7 5,000.00. The down payment
was $17,080.00, the balance was to be paid at the rate
of $300.00 per month including interest at 5% per annum
and these payments were due on the 15th day of each
month. The contract provided for a 45 day grace period.
(Exhibit 1).
In August of 1956 the vendee's interest in this contract was assigned to I. J. Kartchner, (ignoring the assign-
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ment to A. M. J. Inc., Kartchner's alter ego).

(Exhibits

2, 3, and 4.)
On August 1, 1956, I. J. Kartchner, vendor, and Verda
Lynn, vendee, (ignoring the sale to Lynn Realty, Inc.,
Lynn's alter ego) entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract for the sale of the subject property: sales price $86,000.00; payments of $555.00 during 6 months of the year
and of $375.00 during the other 6 months; $4,000.00 down;
interest at 5%. This contract provided for a 30 day grace
period. (Exhibits 6 and 8). On or about the last day of
Nove·mber, 1956J Lynn paid the September and October payments due Hancock ($600.00) to Miller and Viele, Hancocks
duly appointed collection agent. All payments prior to
September were timely made. Lynn made all payments due
Kartchner under the August 10, Uniform Real Estate Contract strictly when due, to and including the payment due
January 10, 1957.
On November 10, 1957, Verda Lynn, vendor, and Eleanor
Blohm, vendee, entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract for the sale of the property in dispute: sales price
$95,705.00; alleged down payment of $5,000.00 by the transfer of other property; monthly payments of $450.00 each
November through May, and $630.00 each June through October; 1st payment due November 1, 1957; interest at the
rate of 5% per annum; and 30 days grace period. (Exhibit
No.6.) On January 10, 1957, Blohm paid Kartchner $380.00.
(Defendants Answer and Counterclaim). On January 10,
1957, Lynn assigned all of her right, title and interest in
and to the Kartchner-Lynn contract and the Lynn-Blohm
contract to the plaintiffs. (Exhibits 6, 7, and 8). On
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Nov~mber

I, 1956, the Hancocks had demanded payment
of past due installments from Kartchner and Lynn. (Exhibit 11).

On March 25, 1957, Leavitt paid $1,500.00 to Kartchner,
and two or three days thereafter the tender was refused
by Hancocks, Kartchner having forwarded the $1,500.00
bank money order of Leavitts' thereto. (Exhibits 11, 13, and
25.)
On March 26, 1957, Kartchner, vendor, and Leavitts,
vendees, entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract dated
August 10, 1956, designed to replace the August 10, 1956,
Kartchner-Lynn contract at this time owned by the Leavitts.
Kartchner also gave Leavitt an option to purchase the
Kartchner equity in the property for 50% of its face value.
(Exhibit No. 5.)
On April 25, 1957, the Hancocks filed their Amended
Complaint in Civil No. 2148 seeking termination of the
Hancock-Smith contract, possession of the property, forfeiture of all sums paid, damages in the sum of $900.00 per
month, and attorney's fees of $1,500.00. Summons had been
served on Eleanor Blohm March 25, 1957, upon the Leavitts
and the Kartchners April 1, and upon Verda Lynn April 9.
No complaints were filed with the clerk of the Court. Lynn,
the Kartchners and the Leavitts filed general denials. In
addition to an answer the Leavitts cross complained against
the Kartchners for $8,37 5.00 and the return of their $1,500.00
money order. No notice to quit was ever served upon
Eleanor Blohm in this or any other action. (Transcript
page 35.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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On or about May 27, 1957, the Hancocks, vendors, and
the Kartchners and one Nephi Cutler, vendees, knowing
full well of the contract rights of the plaintiffs and of the
defendant and knowing full well the unsettled status of
Civil No. 2148, all partie·s to such contract also being parties
to said lawsuit with the exception of Nephi Cutler, entered
into a Uniform Real Estate Contract for the sale of the
property in dispute. (Exhibit No. 9.) This contract also
asdgned all of the rights of the Hancocks in and to their
causes of action set forth in said Civil No. 2148 to the
vendees. This was an obvious attempt to vitiate the Leavitts
equity. The sales price was $60,762.88 (the exact balance
due under the Hancock-Smith contract); the down payment was $2,000.00 (slightly less than the delinquent payments); the monthly payments were $350.00 for 3 years
and $300.00 per month thereafter. The grace period was
only 25 days.
On April 10, 1957, the Leavitts accepted a contract paying $50.00 per month from Blohm instead of her delinquent
payments. The total credit allowed on the contract was
$2,341.67.
On August 9, 1957, the plaintiffs by and through their
alter ego, Vineyard Investment Corporation purchased the
equity of Kartchner and Cutler in and to the May 27 contract. (Exhibit 10.) The June payment on this contract
was timely made and the July payment was accepted by the
Hancocks in the later part of September. At all times
herein mentioned the Leavitts were officers and directors
in Vineyard Investment Corporation and Mrs. Leavitt
owned 98% of its stock.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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On December 10, 1957, the Hancocks filed their complaiilt in Civil No. 2207, seeking forfeiture, repossession and
attorney's fees under the May 27, 1957, contract from the
plaintiffs and the defendant in this action. This suit was
based upon an October 24, 1957, demand for payment which
demanded a June payment which the Hancccks were
estopped from asserting, and demanded 1957 taxes before
the same were due.
Vineyard answered denying
the default and counterclaimed for the sum of $22,500.00. On or about January 21, 1958, the defendant Eleanor
Blohm abandoned the possession of the property to the
Hancocks without notice to the Leavitts. On or about January 31, 1957, these two friendly litigants stipulated that a
default judgment might be entered. This was done by the
Court, without notice to the other parties to the action, the
Leavitts, on February 17, 1958.
Eleanor Blohm was in undisturbed and peaceable possession of the premises from November 10, 1956, to January
21, 1958. (Transcript page 110.) Mrs. Blohm did not make
the entire May, 1957, payment nor did she make any payments thereafter although demand was made for the same.
(Transcript page 126).
On April 22, 1958, the Hancocks, vendors, and the
Leavitts, vendee's, entered into a new Uniform Real Estate
Contract for the sale of the property in dispute. (Exhibit
No. 21.) The purchase price was $60,696.22, the balance due
under the old Hancock-Smith contract, and the down payment was $23,242.00 (the amounts received by the Hancocks
under the old Smith contract excluding interest). On July
8, 1958, the Hancocks brought an action seeking to terminate
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

this agreement. The Leavitts were never served. It is the
cont~ntion of the Leavitts that this lawsuit Civil No. 2236
should be dismissed, the May payment under this contract
haing been timely tendered.
At this time it may be well to review the status of the
myriad contracts month by month:
November 30, 1956. Blohm was delinquent the November 10, payment due Verda Lynn in the amount
of $450.00. The Hancocks were paid through October 15th and that contract was well within the 45
day grace period.
December 31, 1956. Blohm was delinquent two payments of $450.00, and her grace period had lapsed.
The grace period in the Hancock-Smith contract
was still in effect. Kartchner was paid to date.
January 31, 1957: Blohm was behind $970.00 and her
grace period had lapsed. The grace period under the
Hancock-Smith contract had lapsed and it would
have taken $600.00 to reinstate this contract. Kartchner had been paid to date. Leavitt had no knowledge
of any delinquencies.
February 28, 1957. Blohm was l:ehind $1,420.00 and
her contract had lapsed. It required $900.00 to bring
the Hancock contract within the grace period.
March 31, 1957: Leavitt paid Kartchner $1,500.00 on
March 26, which paid his contract with Kartchner
up through June 10, 1957. Hancock was tendered
$1,500.00 which was sufficient to bring the Smith
contract current through the March payment and
extend the grace period to May 1st, 1958.
April 30, 1957:

Blohm had paid a total of $2,721.67
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on her contract which paid the payments through
April 10, 1957, with $21.67 of the May 10 payment
having been made.
May 31, 1957: Blohm had made a partial payment of $21.67 for May and was delinquent $428.33.
The Hancock-Kartchner contract was in full force
and effect.
June 30, 1957: Blohm was delinquent $1,058.33 and
her grace period had expired. The June payment
on the Hancock-Kartchner contract was made.
July 31, 1957: Blohm was delinquent $1,688.33. The
Hancock-Kartchner contract was in full force and
effect.
August 31, 1957: Blohm was delinquent $2,318.33.
The Hancock-Kartchner contract was in full force
and effect.
September 30, 1957: Blohm was delinquent $2,948.33.
The Hancock-Kartchner contract (now assigned to
Leavitt) was in full force and effect.
October 31, 1957: Blohm was delinquent $3,578.33.
The Kartchner-Hancock contract as assigned to
Leavitt was delinquent $350.00.
November 30, 1957: Blohm was delinquent $4,028.33
and Leavitt was delinquent $1,050.00.
December 31, 1957: Blohm was delinquent $4,478.33
and Leavitt was delinquent $1,400.00.
January 31, 1958: Blohm was delinquent $4,928.33.
Leavitt was delinquent $1,750.00.
February 28, 1958: Blohm was delinquent $5,378.33
and Leavitt $2,100.00.
March 31, 1958:

Blohm $5,828.33, Leavitt $2,450.00
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April 30, 1958: Blohm $6,278.33, the Leavitt-Hancock contract of April 22, 1958, is in full force and
effect.
May 31, 1958:

Blohm is delinquent $6,628.33.

November 30, 1958: The Leavitt-Hancock contract
is in full force and effect having never been lawfully terminated, and all payments due having been
tendered prior to lawsuit. Blohm is delinquent $9,878.33. Interest on past due installments to November 10, 1958 is $458.35. It may be well to summarize the benefits received by
each party involved in the property:
The Hancocks received
Verda Lynn received
Jay Kartchner receive~

$ 23,242.00
$ 8,705.00
$ 13,000.00

Eleanor Blohm received 14 months possession and
took $4,500.00 out of the property.
The Leavitts received $2,341.67 and paid out about
$36,000.00.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN D E N Y I N G
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND/OR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED
TO ALLOW THE PLAINTIFF TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT AND/OR INTRODUCE EVIDENCE SHOWSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD REMOVED VALUABLE PERSONAL PROPERTY FROM THE PREMISES FOR WHICH THE PLAINTIFFS SHOULD RECOVER.
POINT III
THE TRIAL C 0 U R T ERRED IN GRANTING
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT AND
SHOULD HAVE ENTERED JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF THE PLAINTIFFS UPON THE SECOND CAUSE
OF ACTION.
ARGUMENT POINT I
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND/OR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS.
The facts in this case as set out in plaintiffs' Statement of Facts were all before the Court below when it
ruled upon plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in
the form of the Exhibits and Depositions of Eleanor Blohm,
Verda Lynn and Jesse J. Leavitt. Upon these facts and
the Exhibits the Court should have ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs in the amount of the installments due under Exhibit 6 (Uniform Real Estate Contract between Verda Lynn
as Seller and Eleanor Blohm as Buyer as assigned to Jesse
J. Leavitt and Phoebe Leavitt).
The pleadings of the defendant in this case at the time
of plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment upon the pleadings adSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mitted the execution of the contract between the defendant
and third party defendant as assigned to the plaintiffs and
in fact set forth the language of this contract in its entirety. (Defendant's Third Party Complaint). This third
party complaint against the third party defendant Lynn
setting forth the claim of defendant for damages by virtue
of the misrepresentations claimed to have been made negative any issue of damages from the plaintiffs for if the defendant was damaged by the misrepresentations of Lynn she
could not have been damaged by any action of the plaintiffs in this case.
If the defendant has any damage for failure of title,
and we do certainly not admit this to be the case, she would
of necessity have to recover these damages from Lynn for
if, as the Court below seems to feel, the contract was in default on November 10, 1956, (plaintiff of course contends
that the Hancock-Smith contract, Exhibit 1, was not so
in default) then defendants claim for damages in this wise
must of necessity be recoverable, if at all, from the third
party defendant since the plaintiffs had not even entered
the picture at this time. Indeed their assignment (Exhibit
6) was not executed until January 10, 1957, and then they
did not assume any existing obligation of the third party
defendant, Lynn, to the defendant, Blohm, but rather were
assigned only whatever right, title and interest Lynn may
have had in the property and in the contracts concerning
the same.

Applying the law to the pleadings, and certainly to the
Motion for Summary Judgment it is difficult to understand
how the Court could fail to grant one motion or the other,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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for a defaulting vendee who knows that her vendor does
not h~ve title but only has a conditional right to secure the
same and must rely upon the contract payments of such
defaulting vendee to perfect such rights cannot recover
from the vendor but the vendor can recover full damages
from the vendee. 55 American Jurisprudence, Section 555.
Roper v. Milbourne, 142 NW 792, 52 A.L.R. 1530.
Seeking v. King, 17 A2d 869, 134 A.L.R. 1060. These cases
are broad enough of course to sustain the claim of the plaintiffs for specific performance of the contract to the extent
of the payments past due under the contract. The defendant in her answer admits that no payments were made beyond June, 1957.
L1 order to recover damages when title fails the vendee
must tender possession and at least be able to tender the
payments. 55 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, Sections
556, 605, 601, 602; McKeller v. Paxton, 218 P 128; Nelson v.
Fernando, 55 P2d 859, 134 A.L.R. 1088; Hardin v. Union,
271 NW 176; Fitcher v. Walling, 279 NW 417; Fleisheher
v. Lockwood, 16 NYS 205; Miller v. Smith, 267 NW 176;
Stryker v. Marschner, 264 NW 344; Continental v. Jones,
142 SW 401; and Thayer v. McGill, 55 P2d 1272. In the
instant case the defendant tendered neither possession nor
the back payments, and the pleadings so admit.
The; following language appears in McBride v. Stewart,
68 Utah 12, 249 P 114, 48 ALR 267, in turn citing Foxley v.
Rich, 35 Utah 162, 99 P. 666:
"The Court in that ca3e held that the purchaser
of land who was in default and had abandoned the
premises, and who had refused to make the payments
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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stipulated after repeated requests, could not recover the money paid. Clearly under the facts recited in that case, no other conclusion ought to have
been reached than that the plaintiff (vendee) there
was not entitled to recover the money paid as part of
the purchase price. He had refused to make the payments, had abandoned the property, and had still
refused to pay when requested ... "
The facts in the instant case are squarely in point with
the Foxley case.
In McKellar v. Paxton, 62 Utah 97, 218 P. 128, wherein
the vendors seek to recover the full unpaid purchase price
of the property from the vendees, the Court said:
"In Harvey v. Morris, 63 Mo. 475, the Court
Said : 'Where a purchaser of land, by virtue of the
contract of purchase, is put in possession of the land
purchased, he cannot resist the payment cf the purchase money without offering to restore the possession thus acquired by him to the venor. He cannot
be permitted to occupy, possess and enjoy the profits
of the land bought and at the same time be allowed
to withhold the price agreed to be paid.'"
"That language is quoted by the Supreme Court
of Kansas in Dunn v. Mills, 70 Kan. 656, 79 P 147; 3
Ann Cas. 363. See also, McCourt v. Johns, 33 Or 561,
53 P 601; Taft v. Kessel, 16 Wis 273; Wickman v.
Robinson, 14 Wis 493, 80 Am Dec 789.
"It is further insisted and argued as a defense
against plaintiffs' claim that the testimony showed
plaintiffs were unable to convey a merchantable title.
The covenants on the part of plaintiffs and defendants, as found in the written contract, are independent and mutual. The plaintiffs bound themselves
to 'convey or cause to be conveyed in fee simple ...
by warranty deed, when payment by said purc_haser
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the consideration . . . shall have been full performed.' The purchasers undertook to make the
payments as stated in the agreement. By the plain
provisions of the contract, the seller was not required nor obligated to convey the premises until
the full purchase price had been paid. In the absence
of some showing that plaintiffs did not have title
to the premises, or could not acquire title, it may
seriously be doubted whether the defect of title,
if there was a defect, could be interposed as a defense to plaintiffs' action to recover the purchase
price." (Italics supplied by the writer).
The facts in the instant case are squarely in point with this
law on the subject.
Section 601 of 55 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE is
hereinbelow repeated in its entirety:
"Performance or Offer by Purchaser to Perform: Effect of Default of Purchaser-In accordance
with the general rule that a party to a contract
who asks for rescission thereof must himself be
without fault, there is considerable authority supporting the broad view that purchaser in default
is not entitled to rescind and recover back
money paid upon the p u r c h a s e price. In
this connection, it may be observed that, as hereinbefore mentioned, where the promise to convey
the title required by the contract is conditioned
upon payment, the vendor is not obligated to convey
and there can be no breach unless payment is made
or tendered; in such a case the purchaser must pay
or tender payment in order to put the vendor in default. Accordingly, where the vendor's promise
is conditioned upon performance by the purchaser
of whatever is to be performed upon his part, which
is, of course, chiefly the payment of the purchase
price, nonperformance by the vendor does not conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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stitute a breach warranting rescission unless the
purchaser performs or tenders performance. In
other words, where the vendor's promise is so conditioned, the purchaser must perform or tender performance in order to put the vendor in default and
entitle the purchaser to rescind the executory contract and recover back money paid upon the purchase
price. Thus, a vendee's nonperformance of a covenant therein to make improvement has been held
to accrue when the contract price is fully paid. A
purchaser of land who does not offer to perform
the contract on his part until several days after the
time set for performance cannot enforce a forfeiture
for nonperformance on the part of the vendor. However, even though the vendor's promise is conditioned upon payment by the purchaser of the purchase price, there may be an obligation to perform
and a breach upon the part of the vendor without
payment or tender of payment by the purchaser
where payment or tender of payment would be useless, as where the vendor us unable or refuses to
perform. Accordingly, where performance or tender
of performance by the vendee would be useless, the
vendee need not perform or tender performance in
order to rescind for a breach of the vendor." (Italics
supplied by writer.)
The Court's attention is directed to 40 A. L. R. 693,
where it is said:
"See also Poheim v. Meyers (1908) 9 Cal. App.
31, 98 Pac. 65, in which it is held that where the
vendee in a contract in which time is of the essence
is in default, he cannot, without tendering the balance due, recover a payment theretofore made on the
contract, on the ground that the title of the vendor is
defective.
"The decisions on the subject appear to warrant
the following generalizations: Where the vendor
has until the time for performance to obtain title
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to the property which he has contracted to convey,
or to remedy defects in such title, the purchaser
cannot, prior to the time of performance claim the
right to rescind because of such defects, and so
must make a tender in order to put the vendor in
default. Papesh v. Wagnon (1916) 29 Idaho 93, 157
Pac. 775; Laub v. De Vault (1908) 139 111. App. 398;
Claude v. Richardson (1905) 127 Iowa, 623, 103 N. W.
991; Greenby v. Cheevers (1812) 9 Johns, (N. Y.)
126; Pioneer Gold Min. Co. v. Price (1915) 189 Mo.
App. 30, 176 S. W. 474; Goldman v. Willis (1901)
64 App. Div. 508, 72 N. Y. Supp. 282; Ward v. James
(1917) 84 Or. 375, 164 Pac. 370, 372 ...
"Where under the terms of the contract the
obligation to pay precedes or accompanies the obligation to make ti tie, the purchaser must, in order to
put the seller in default, pay or offer to pay the purchase money; and hence cannot rescind on the
ground of a defect in the title without tendering
performance on his part. Dennis v. Straseburger
(1891) 89 Cal. 583, 26 Pac. 1070; Leach v. Rowley
(1903) 138 Cal. 709, 72 Pac. 403; Eames v. Germania
Turn Verein (1881) 8 Ill. App. 663; Claude v. Richardson (1905) 127 Iowa 623, 103 N. W. 991; Hartley
v. James (1872) 50 N.Y. 38.'J
Also op. ei te page 696:
"Mere defect of title in the vendor, and a present
inability to give such a title as he covenanted to
give, do not in all cases dispense with the necessity
of payment of the entire purchase money and the
demand by the vendee of a conveyance, in order to
entitle the latter to maintain an action to recover
back the purchase money already paid; and where
in such an action there is no proof of tender of payment of the purchase money and of demand for the
conveyance, and it is shown that, notwithstanding
an infirmity of title in the vendor, if the purchase
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
money had been paid the vendee could and would
have obtained a title conforming to the covenant,
the plaintiff cannot maintain the action. Pate v.
McConnell (1894) 106 Ala. 449, 18 So. 98; Drake v.
Nunn (1923) 210 Ala. 136, 97 So. 211.
"In Dennis v. Strassburger (1891) 89 Cal. 583, 26
Pac. 1070, an action to recover the amount of a deposit in part payment made under a contract reciting
the sale of certain property for a stated sum and
further providing: 'fifteen days allowed for examination of title and completion of purchase; i. e.
$7,200 is to be paid upon the tender of good and sufficient deed conveying a title; if title is defective
thirty days are allowed to perfect the same, and, if
after the expiration of said term, unless extended
by mutual consent, the title shall not have been perfected, the deposit is to be returned on demand. If
the sale is not consummated according to the foregoing conditions, the deposit is to be forfeited and
become the property of the undersigned. Time is
the essence of this contract'-it was. held that, in
order to recover, the plaintiff should have tendered
the balance of the purchase price and demanded his
deed, and, if such demand was refused, he should
then have demanded the return of his money; that
if he based his right of recovery upon defective title
he should have notified defendant that the title was
defective; and, if upon the expiration of thirty days
from that time defendant had not perfected his
title, then he should have demanded a return of the
amount paid, and a refusal would have formed a
basis for a good cause of action."
Also 40 A. L. R. 700:
"But in Joyce v. Shafer (1893) 97 Cal. 335, 32
Pac. 320, where it appeared that some time after
the last payment fell due, the vendor, without tendering a deed to the purchaser or demanding payment from her, without her consent sold and conveyed the land to another, it was held that the purSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16

chaser could not sue to recover the money paid, without having tendered the amount due on the contract,
since, nothwithstanding the conveyance to the third
person, the vendor might be able, when the time of
performance should arrive, to furnish a good title.
"Where the conveyance to a third person is
shown to have been made subject to the contract, the
purchaser cannot sue to recover his deposit without first tendering performance. Nance v. Avenall
(1915) 20 Cal. App. 551, 147 Pac. 583."
The significant fact in connection with the law stated
as applied to the facts in the instant case is that whatever
damage the defendant Blohm suffered she suffered because
of her own failure to make payments for if the payments
had been made she would have ultimately received her
title. For these reasons the Court below should have
granted plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings
and/or motion for summary judgment and awarded the
plaintiffs damages in the amount of the delinquent payments under the contract.
ARGUMENT POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED
TO ALLOW THE PLAINTIFF TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT AND/OR INTRODUCE EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD REMOVED VALUABLE PERSONAL PROPERTY FROM THE PREMISES FOR WHICH THE PLAINTIFFS SHOULD RECOVER.
Wherever a claim is asserted by one the other always
has the right to minimize the damages claimed by showing
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either that the damages were not that great or by showing
any off-sets he may have etc. In the instant case the pretrial
order was certainly broad enough to allow the plaintiffs
to introduce such evidence but the Court summarily denied this request.
Rule 15 (a) of the U. R. C. P., UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, provides" ... Otherwise a party may
amend his pleadings only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse part; and leave shall be fr,eely given
when justic,e so requires . . . " (!tallies supplied by the
writer). Certainly the discretion of the Court below was
abused in this instance for the defendant admitted that
it could not claim surprise and the plaintiffs asserted that
they had discovered these facts only since the pre-trial.
(Transcript pages 3, and 4.) Certainly an injustice is done
if the defendant is allowed to have the value of this personal property and also a j1..1dgment against the plaintiffs
without offset.
ARGUMENT POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT AND
SHOULD HAVE ENTERED JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF THE PLAINTIFFS UPON THE SECOND CAUSE
OF ACTION.
The Court at this point is requested to examine all
of the law and all of the cases cited to it by the plaintiffs
in their argument of Point I. It is our position that this law
is concise and clear and that the facts in the instant case
clearly square with the facts in the cases cited. For this
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reason it is only urged in the alternative that if then the
defendant is entitled to damages, the true measure thereof
is the difference in the value of the property less the balance due under the contract. 55 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, Section 510, 556; Pembroke v. Caudill, 37 S2d 538.
So of course the trial Court erred in excluding Exhibit 28,
showing the value of the Phoenix property to be at best
$25,000.00, and in ignoring the stipulated value of the Heber
City property at $47,500.00. Transcript page 100. Mr.
Hatch also stipulated that the appraisers who authored
Exhibit 28 were qualified experts and that if they were
called they would testify to the effect set out in said Exhibit. Unfortunately because of the questionable censorship of the court reporter this is not included in the transcript and further because the Court would not give the
plaintiffs extra time to secure this additional part of the
proceedings from the court reporter who was "too busy" to
start working on the same before the end of February. However, Mr. Hatch, I am sure, will not at this late date deny
this stipulation.
When this value is compared with the contract balance
due of about $87,000.00 it is apparent that the defendant
has no damages under this theory of the law but in fact
the damages are minus $40,000.00. "The Courts cannot
supervise decisions made in the business world and grant
relief when the bargain proves improvident." Col~ v.
Parker, 5 Utah 2d 275, 300 P2d 623.
Neither has the defendant any damages for her down
payment since its value was only $25,000.00 and she owed
$31,000.00 or this property. (Transcript page 109.) The
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parties, set no value on this property, they merely traded
equities. (Transscript page 99}.
CONCLUSION
The judgment against the plaintiffs should be set aside
and the cause remanded for further proceedings or in the
alternative the Trial Court should be ordered to enter judgment on the pleadings or otherwise in the amount of the
delinquent payments due from the defendant to the plaintiffs under the contract set forth in Exhibit 6.
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